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National Parties and Racial Disenfranchisement 
R I C H A R D  M .  V A L E L L Y  
ABOUT A CENTURY ago, conservative southern white politicians began to 
institute a system of electoral rules—literacy and good understanding tests, 
the poll tax and the like—intended to destroy their political opposition. 
When they finished around 1910, they had in effect killed off African 
American voting in this country, since the great majority of African Amer­
icans lived in the South. Lacking robust political representation, black 
Americans became vulnerable not just to Jim Crow but also to a gradual 
strengthening of de facto color lines in the nation as a whole. Color lines 
grew brighter in national and public settings (e.g., the District of Columbia, 
the federal civil service, the dining rooms of the Congress), in national 
institutions (e.g., the armed forces), and in national policies (e.g., social 
security and federal work relief in the 1930s)—all influenced by Congress 
and by southern Democrats. Such public segregation in turn tacitly legiti­
mated efforts by northern party machines with white ethnic clienteles to 
establish color lines in public employment, schooling, and housing. The 
stage was thus set for the ghettos that greeted black migrants from the 
South for decades to come. By the 1930s and 1940s color lines were so 
much a feature of national life that Gunnar Myrdal aptly characterized their 
existence as an "American dilemma."1 This chapter on disenfranchisement 
tells a tale worth telling, therefore, not only because disenfranchisement 
was an extraordinary process, a shocking reversal of Reconstruction's 
democratic gains that ushered in Jim Crow, but also because it clarifies the 
political origins of racial hierarchy in America today. 
My approach to disenfranchisement focuses on national party conflict 
and its impact on the region. Such factors as poverty among black south­
erners, the restoration of the cotton kingdom and its quasi-feudal relation­
ships, and continuing white racism, in both North and South, all abetted 
disenfranchisement.2 But Reconstruction's democratic gains had depended 
critically on the decisions of national Republican leaders. So too the even­
tual destruction of these gains in the 1890s, some two decades after the 
end of Reconstruction, also depended on the decisions of national Republi­
can leaders. 
This chapter thus joins a growing literature that corrects two widely held 
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misconceptions: that disenfranchisement dates from the collapse of Recon­
struction and that the politics of racial equality dropped from the national 
agenda after the Compromise of 1877. The prospects of African American 
suffrage dimmed, to be sure, with Reconstruction's collapse—but voting 
continued, often at high levels, well into the 1880s. Black elected officials 
served in southern state legislatures and in Congress to the end of the nine­
teenth century. In the 1890s a militant biracial movement gained control of 
North Carolina's government. Parts of the South, even the Deep South, 
remained highly contested terrain long after 1877.3 
Below I consider how national party dynamics affected (1) African 
American politicians and white allies, both southern Republicans and 
third-party independents (consider them "inclusionists"), and (2) regional 
conservative and race-baiting white Democrats (consider them "exclusion-
ists"). Although the best literature on post-Reconstruction politics ade­
quately covers regional and state-level party dynamics, rather less is known 
about the interaction between region and nation. The distinctive contribu­
tion of this article is to show that the eventual certainty of disenfranchise­
ment depended on far-reaching change in the structure of national party 
competition.4 
Party Dynamics, Systemwide Competition, and Democracy 
Party competition is rightly regarded as a condition of democracy. It gives 
rival parties incentives to monitor each other for abuses of rights of politi­
cal association and speech. Rallies, appeals to the public, and open meet­
ings are crucial for the business of conducting campaigns and winning of­
fice. Party competition also can give parties incentives to work to include 
new social groups, either competitively or even singly, as the case of south­
ern Republicanism during Reconstruction shows. 
But these desirable consequences of party competition depend critically 
on whether parties compete and mobilize throughout an entire system. The 
political prospects of African Americans often have been linked to major 
party commitment to systemwide conflict. This was particularly true in the 
nineteenth century, given the demographic concentration of African Amer­
icans in the South. 
During the Reconstruction, the Republican Party made a commitment to 
contest elections in the South, leading to the establishment of a national 
electoral regulatory system. That system survived the fall of the Recon­
struction. The Republican Party still needed the South, as we will see, so 
persisting in its commitment to contest southern elections, often enough to 
add considerably to the political uncertainties of the region. The party not 
only sought to enforce the electoral regulatory system; it also advertised its 
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persistence in party platforms, carried on congressional campaigning, and 
insisted on mounting investigations of electoral fraud and intimidation. 
To be sure, the Supreme Court weakened much of the electoral regula­
tory system. Yet the Court also greatly strengthened the Federal Elections 
Act of 1871, governing congressional elections. This helped to set the stage 
for a fierce congressional battle between 1889 and 1891 over the wide-
ranging Federal Elections Bill (commonly known as the Force Bill or the 
Lodge Bill). A briefer battle between 1893 and 1894 also followed. Con­
gressional Democrats, empowered by the first unified Democratic govern­
ment since the antebellum Buchanan administration, then undertook a 
largely successful repeal of all the Reconstruction-era federal elections 
statutes. Still, from 1894 to 1896 there was sharp rearguard sniping from 
congressional Republicans as they sought investigations of election fraud 
and unseated southern Democrats in the House. 
To put the story another way, from the Reconstruction to the 1890s 
Democratic-Republican contestation in and over the South was marked by 
(1) fundamental disagreement over the boundaries of the suffrage, due to a 
Republican commitment to contest elections in the South, and therefore by 
(2) intense but opposed preferences within the two parties over electoral 
institutions. Let me briefly consider both features of this contestation be­
fore sketching the conditions of a shift in the terms of Democratic-Republi­
can conflict in the region. 
Fundamental Disagreement over Boundaries of the Suffrage 
While the post-Reconstruction party system had a variety of formal demo­
cratic features, in a key respect it was unusual: one party, the Democratic 
Party, preferred to demobilize a significant portion of the Republican 
Party's electoral base. The term compromise in a sense is misleading when 
applied to the Compromise of 1877. America's two competing party lead­
erships did not compromise in 1877 their disagreement over the boundaries 
of the suffrage because the Republicans had already invested so many re­
sources in the South. Here the concepts of commitment to contest and sunk 
costs are helpful. 
U.S. parties have no natural stake in generating processes of mobiliza­
tion and contestation across the entire system—they must be motivated to 
do so. Such features of the American system as the electoral college pro­
vide strong incentives for a selective approach to mobilization that 
achieves unified government, in contrast with, for instance, a parliamentary 
system of proportional representation, where pressures for systemwide mo­
bilization to gain control of government are greater. Thus an American 
party leadership does not always mount a contest in jurisdictions where 
historically their party has had no strong presence. But if it does, the result 
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can be a dramatic increase in the system's scope of contestation, as hap­
pened during the Reconstruction.5 
Once made, furthermore, a commitment to contest is abandoned only ( a )  
when the commitment clearly becomes politically very costly and (b) when 
alternatives to it open up. Parties, like firms, do not easily write off the very 
large sunk costs of making a commitment to contest. The rate of return (in 
terms of winning national offices) to developing other commitments to 
contest must be manifestly higher than the rate of return to existing com­
mitments. Unless the rate of return to existing commitments drops rapidly, 
new commitments will not rapidly take over at the margin. Political actors 
who must evaluate alternative rates of return are always uncertain in their 
evaluation. They also often have some level of ideological attachment to 
existing commitments to contest and their anticipated rates of return.6 
The problem, then, with the conventional wisdom about the Compro­
mise of 1877—holding that Republicans abruptly abandoned their African 
American constituencies—is that it asks one to ignore these kinds of con­
siderations. Implicitly it holds that the huge sunk costs of the Republican 
commitment to contest southern elections, undertaken during Reconstruc­
tion, were summarily written off. Echoing the wisdom that the Compro­
mise of 1877 was so grand and sweeping that it lasted until the 1960s, two 
analysts recently stated that the "ending of Reconstruction marked the end 
of race as a national political issue" for many decades. But in fact the na­
tional salience of race reemerged fairly soon after the Compromise was 
struck—as suggested (we see below in table 8.1) by a technique that these 
same analysts devised. In other words, sunk costs were not summarily writ­
ten off.7 
Let me turn to another general feature of the post-Reconstruction situa­
tion. If the parties disagreed over the boundaries of the suffrage and if the 
same region mattered to both of them, then one would expect that they also 
had strong preferences about the rules of the electoral game. One might 
expect that they cared deeply whether national or local electoral rules ap­
plied in the South. If the rules were national, then Republicans had a better 
chance of shaping electoral outcomes; if they were local, then Democrats 
had the advantage. In fact, the two parties did have intense and opposed 
preferences about electoral institutions. 
Intense and Opposed Preferences about Electoral Institutions 
In the post-Reconstruction period, both parties renewed their previous Re­
construction-era straggle over electoral rules and institutions. Both re­
mained cohesive with regard to electoral regulatory policy. The Republi­
cans preferred national rules developed during the Reconstruction; the 
Democrats opposed such rules, preferring regional or local rules.8 
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There were, of course, debates within the Republican Party about its 
southern policy after 1877, and they seem to have had effects on platform 
writing as shifts in the figures reported in table 8.1 below will suggest. But 
even amid the worst outbreak of factionalism over southern policy that 
occurred after the Reconstruction (during the 1890-91 battle for the Fed­
eral Elections Bill), most of the Republican Party was united behind na­
tional electoral regulation. 
In making an effort to regulate national elections, Republicans were 
hampered by decisions the Supreme Court had made during Reconstruc­
tion and, of course, by southern Democrats. But in one particular area of 
electoral regulation, congressional electoral regulation, the basis for an ex­
pansion of national regulation became possible through successful Justice 
Department litigation and cases won by Republicans in lower federal 
courts. The most important decision came when the Supreme Court an­
nounced in March 1884 in ex parte Yarbrough that a national statutory 
effort to regulate congressional elections was permitted under article 1, 
section 4. The Court stated what it had declined to declare during Recon­
struction, despite opportunities to do so: that the Fifteenth Amendment 
conferred a national and nationally enforceable right to vote on African 
Americans. In other words, the rate of return on the southern commitment 
to contest did not clearly seem to drop monotonically after 1877. Indeed, 
after Yarbrough key Republicans could well conclude that any drop in the 
rate of return could be reversed sharply with appropriate statutory effort. 
The time to act on this opportunity occurred during the Harrison admin­
istration in connection with the Federal Elections Bill of 1890-91. The 
politics of the bill is sometimes treated as a charade that no one really took 
seriously. The problem with this view is that not only Republicans but also 
southerners took the bill very seriously. The Democratic Party made elec­
toral institutional reform its leading issue in the 1892 presidential election, 
as we will see. 
Given (1) disagreement over the boundaries of the suffrage and similar 
regional commitments and (2) sharply diverging preferences over electoral 
institutions, Republican-Democratic conflict over the future of southern 
politics was, in fact, surprisingly deep and intractable. What the Compro­
mise of 1877 settled, in other words, was the presidential election of 1876 
and whether or not federal troops would be used to police elections. Further 
conflict was not ruled out. This was good news for the democratic inclusion 
of African Americans. For their own reasons, the leaders of a major institu­
tion, the Republican Party, continued to invest resources in resisting black 
demobilization from the political system. The result was a continuing and 
high level of systemic conflict. 
One condition, of course, for resolution of this conflict was abandon­
ment by Democrats of their bid to demobilize African Americans from 
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politics. But there was a consensus between both the northern and southern 
wings of the post-Civil War Democratic Party that African American suf­
frage posed a threat to the Democratic Party's chances of ever reexercising 
control of national institutions.9 
Thus resolution at the national level of the conflict over the control of 
electoral institutions and ultimately over African American suffrage re­
quired (1) that somehow the anticipated rate of return to Republicans' his­
toric commitment to contest southern elections drop appreciably, unmis­
takably, and quickly, and (2) that somehow the rate of return to newly 
developed commitments to contest, or to preexisting nonsouthern commit­
ments to contest, rise. Either new voters, new jurisdictions, or both new 
voters and new jurisdictions had to be brought into the political system to 
offset losses to the party threatened with demobilization—that is, the Re­
publican Party. In other words, full Republican abandonment of its South­
ern commitment to contest—one that would clearly alter the political 
opportunities facing African Americans, their allies, and their opponents— 
depended on a manifest change in Republican opportunities in the national 
electoral market. 
Yet where would this shift in market opportunities come from? There 
was a pro-Republican realignment at the electoral level in the 1890s in the 
North and the Midwest—but was it sufficient to motivate Republican aban­
donment of the South? How was it possible for the Republican abandon­
ment actually to occur? This conundrum gets to the relationship between 
geography and party competition. 
Geography, Realignment, and a Western Commitment 
The geographic boundaries of most modern political systems are fixed or 
change very slowly, seeming to preclude the addition of new jurisdictions 
to compensate any party threatened by demobilization of a constituency. 
But the United States in the late-nineteenth century was unusual in the 
extent to which geography could rapidly affect the relative positions of the 
parties in the electoral market.10 The system had a large "reserve" of unor­
ganized territory that had been acquired through conquest of a militarily 
weak Native American population. This territorial expansion had an intri­
cate link to black disenfranchisement and thus to the making of modern 
America. Republican organization of western territories during the Harri­
son administration—accelerating a process that Republicans had engi­
neered for decades—immediately preceded Republican mobilization of 
new voters and conversion of existing voters in the older, existing jurisdic­
tions of the Northeast and Midwest, amid the heat and turmoil over mone­
tary and trade policy that marked the realigning sequence of the 1890s. 
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Together these phenomena—acquisition of new voters through acquisi­
tion of new territories (i.e., a Western commitment to contest) and acquisi­
tion of new voters through mobilization and change in voter preferences 
(i.e., realignment)—helped to set the stage for a Republican withdrawal 
from southern affairs in the closing years of the nineteenth century. A 
southern policy was thus no longer needed. The South became unnecessary 
to the Republican Party as a vote-getting, office-seeking political organiza­
tion. Also, the costs of continuing to compete in the southern electoral 
market increased due to sharp Democratic resistance to the Federal Elec­
tions Bill, further outlined below. 
This final Republican withdrawal from southern politics in turn critically 
affected the political capacities of regional actors and made black disen-
franchisement quite unstoppable. Here I borrow the concept of political 
opportunity structure from the social movement literature. The simple 
ideas here are: (1) repeated signals from the political environment are either 
promising or forbidding and political actors respond accordingly; and (2) 
whether national political parties sustain a regional strategy of mobiliza­
tion is a crucial signal to regional actors engaged in struggle with each 
other that will affect their calculations and behavior. 
Of course, between the weak and the strong there are differences in how 
quickly they can respond to shifts in the political environment. But even 
the seemingly weak are inserted within networks that are often easily over­
looked by observers. Reconstruction necessarily left a legacy of democratic 
institutions—black churches, schools, and newspapers and autonomous 
black settlements and neighborhoods—and it left a large class of trained 
and skillful black politicians. The resulting networks permitted political 
communication, debate, and contact among potential leaders, activists, and 
followers. The political capacities of actors in these "networks of the 
weak"—African Americans and their white allies in the region—were crit­
ically influenced by how national party politics created a regional political 
opportunity structure. When that structure changed, both exclusionists and 
inclusionists appear to have understood the character of the change and to 
have reacted accordingly.11 
Let me turn from this overview of the argument to its elaboration. This 
elaboration proceeds by my first sketching in the Republican Party's Re-
construction-era commitment to contest southern elections. Then I very 
briefly consider selected aspects of the Republican Party's post-Recon-
struction commitment to contest southern elections. Third, I treat the logics 
of the Republican abandonment of the South that occurred during the 
McKinley administration. Fourth, I consider the regional impact of this 
abandonment. I conclude with both a summary of and a brief reflection on 
the implications of my account. 
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A Commitment to Contest, 1867-1877 
The Confederate States of America's military defeat in 1865 settled the 
issue of whether two nations would exist where one had existed before. But 
that settlement simultaneously opened up basic questions about the future 
both of political representation in the restored Union and of the role of 
parties in representation. By 1867 the Republican Party partly resolved 
these questions by sponsoring far-reaching change in three areas: (1) na­
tional constitutional law (the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amend­
ments) and the statutory law of national constitutional implementation (the 
military Reconstruction acts); (2) the policy orientations, tax codes, and 
institutions of the former Confederate states via the recasting of their con­
stitutions under the aegis of military Reconstruction; and (3) the structure 
of the party system, as Republican organizations were rapidly built in the 
former Confederate states. 
These were tightly linked domains. The changes in national constitu­
tional law were also changes in the rules of representation and in the 
electoral rules. They permitted the establishment of new civilian govern­
ments in the former rebel states based on radically different constitutions 
that embodied new social commitments. The establishment of these gov­
ernments in turn permitted the rapid creation of a new concentration of 
party elites—black politicians; indigenous white politicians active before 
the war in southern electoral politics who committed themselves to new 
forms of social and political representation (known today as the scala­
wags); and, finally, northern white politicians and men on the make who 
came South, carrying a mix of ambition, career self-interest, and new, 
egalitarian social commitments (known today as carpetbaggers). A large 
array of offices was made available to this new political elite by national-
level constitutional change, and the resulting, state-level elections and 
constitution making. In turn, the provision of offices to a new political 
elite aided the crash construction of a southern wing for a political party 
that had never had any presence in southern jurisdictions—the Republican 
Party.12 
Development of a Protective, Regulatory Apparatus 
Southern Democratic backlash to the Republican Party's sweeping 
commitment to contest electoral politics throughout the South came, to a 
considerable degree, in the form of widespread, clandestine, paramili­
tary violence directed against the new Republican leadership in the South 
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and against freedmen institutions—newspapers, schools, churches, politi­
cal clubs. In response, Republican Congresses reinforced the Fifteenth 
Amendment, which stated that the "right of citizens of the United States 
to vote" could not be abridged or denied "on account of race, color, or 
previous condition of servitude." The Enforcement Act of May 1870 
protected national, state, and local electoral processes from discriminatory 
administration, and implemented this goal through criminalizing both 
private and public obstruction of the right to vote related to racial conflict 
and through placing administration of the act within the federal courts 
and the Justice Department. It authorized the president to use military force 
"to aid in the execution of judicial process" and, further, permitted federal 
judges, marshals, and attorneys to form posses in aid of judicial process. 
The Ku Klux Klan Act of April 1871 was a wide-ranging statute that au­
thorized "action at law" for a victim deprived of rights by a person acting 
"under color of any law," held that private conspiracies to interfere with 
the exercise of a citizen's rights were a "high crime" subject to certain 
specific and harsh penalties, and permitted military suppression of "in­
surrection, domestic violence, unlawful combinations, or conspiracies" 
crippling state governments in the maintenance of their law-and-order re­
sponsibilities.13 
Through the Department of Justice (established in 1870), the Republican 
Party regularly deployed special (if temporary) Justice Department lawyers 
and U.S. attorneys, and other personnel (U.S. marshals, federal troops, 
special election commissioners) on behalf of its southern constituencies. 
A special fee system for the marshals and attorneys (the more violations 
tried and the more often process served, the greater one's income) tied 
together their pecuniary interests, their political loyalties, and the enforce­
ment of a new, radically more inclusive system of representation. Besides 
the frequent military interventions and deployment of federal troops 
initiated by the president or on his authority, the Department of Justice 
launched a total of 3,635 criminal cases between 1870 and 1877 in the 
South.14 
In addition, Republicans attached their southern policy to a program of 
northern "urban reconstruction" via the Federal Elections Act (1871), 
sometimes known as the Second Force Act. The Federal Elections Act cre­
ated a quite different electoral regulatory system than the Enforcement Act 
and its followup, the Ku Klux Klan Act, had. Those statues were largely 
Fifteenth Amendment enforcement statutes, although the Ku Klux Klan 
Act also permitted criminal enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment (at 
least until the Supreme Court halted this use of the act.) They depended on 
the Department of Justice and the president for their effective administra­
tion, and were clearly aimed at the South. The 1871 Federal Elections Act, 
in contrast, had a different and northern origin and established a different, 
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largely northern system. Still, it was later amended so that in principle it 
applied to all rural districts as well, thus creating the rudiments of a fully 
national system. It would become the basis for the Federal Elections Bill of 
1890-91, mentioned above.15 
Limits of the Reconstruction Commitment 
By 1877, though, Republican efforts to invest heavily in building a series 
of new state-level parties in the former Confederate South seemed a fail­
ure—with seemingly obvious implications for the recent increase in the 
system's scope of contestation. In addition, the Supreme Court had weak­
ened the Fifteenth Amendment electoral regulatory system. In this connec­
tion, a key Fifteenth Amendment case is relevant—United States v. Reese 
(1876), involving denial of ballots to African Americans by Kentucky offi­
cials. Reese damaged the federal criminal enforcement machinery by hold­
ing two provisions of the Enforcement Act of 1870 unconstitutional. At a 
time when black voting rights and southern Republican Parties were facing 
challenge all through the South, the decision's political impact was deeply 
discouraging to federal attorneys. Another 1876 decision handed down 
with Reese—United States v. Cruikshank, a Fourteenth Amendment case 
on appeal from Louisiana involving a gruesome massacre of over one hun­
dred African Americans—also suggested hostility among the Supreme 
Court's justices to national involvement in southern affairs. In Cruikshank 
the Court held that criminal justice in Fourteenth Amendment matters was 
a state, not a national, prerogative. IfLouisiana failed to punish a massacre, 
the Court suggested there was not much scope for federal action.16 
To sum up: The Reconstruction developed into a relatively thorough 
effort to recast the party system of the South. A national regulatory appara­
tus reinforced this effort. But by the end of Reconstruction this apparatus 
faced a severe judicial challenge. Yet, we will see, the Republican Party 
persisted after the Reconstruction in its commitment to systemwide compe­
tition. Let me turn to briefly sketching the persistence of a commitment 
to contest. 
Renewed Involvement: Indicators and Incentives 
Republican involvement, and an effort at electoral regulation in the South, 
hardly died after the Reconstruction. Several indicators show that fairly 
soon after 1877 there was a significant revival of the Reconstruction-era 
involvement. Consider the first of these in table 8.1. It displays scores for 
the parties on salience to them of their struggle over enforcement of equal 
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TABLE 8.1 
Priority Index of Equal Suffrage for Major Party Platforms, 1868-1892 
1868 1872 1876 1880 1884 1888 1892 
Republicans 0.93 1.0 0.89 0.14 0.04 0.85 0.76 
Democrats 0.37 0.93 1.0 0.72 0.45 0.00 0.96 
Source: Porter and Johnson 1966. 
TABLE 8.2 
House Races Contested in the Former Confederacy, 1878-1892 (Average Percentages) 
1878 1880 1882 1884 1886 1888 1890 1892 
All 85% 94% 94% 91% 67% 92% 81% 93% 
Reps. 48% 76% 61% 91% 52% 86% 66% 54% 
Source: Congressional Quarterly's Guide to U.S. Elections 1985, 2d ed. 
Note: States are Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, 
South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia. 
suffrage in the South and (after 1870) of the Fifteenth Amendment. The 
crucial assumption here is that the earlier an issue appears in a platform, the 
more important it probably is. Importance of the equal suffrage issue is 
measured by 1.0 minus the ratio of the number of the paragraph containing 
the first explicit reference to black suffrage rights and the total number of 
paragraphs. The higher the number, the greater the importance, and vice 
versa; the maximum value is 1.0, the lowest 0. By this measure Republican 
involvement initially dropped, but then grew substantially.17 
A second indicator of a continuing involvement is participation in con­
gressional races. Consider the rows in table 8.2. The first is the regional 
average of all House races contested in general elections; the second is the 
regional average of all House races contested in general elections by candi­
dates willing to label themselves as Republicans or willing to run fusion 
candidacies that retained a Republican label. Clearly there were ups and 
downs, but overall one sees a strong performance—a party persisting in 
candidate recruitment and campaigning. 
Yet another indicator is the number of congressional investigations of 
southern election fraud and violence. Table 8.3 shows, first, the number of 
congressional investigations of southern elections fraud and violence in 
two periods, Reconstruction and the period after Reconstruction up to and 
through the Fifty-fourth Congress. These investigations led to published 
reports, and they differ from contested elections cases. The table shows, 
second, the number of investigations sponsored by the two parties during 
the two periods.18 Overall, three times as many investigations occurred in 
the Senate, where Republicans continuously organized the chamber from 
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TABLE 8.3 
Congressional Investigations of Southern Election Fraud and Violence, 
during and after Reconstruction 
40th-44th Congresses 45th-54th Congresses 
House investigations 
Republican 5 0 
Democrat 2 2 
Senate investigations 
Republican 14 7 
Democrat 0 0 
Sources: Congressional Information Service, 1985; Goldman 1976. 
TABLE 8.4 
Contested Elections Politics, House of Representatives, 45th-54th Congresses 
Congress Total Cases Southern Cases Disposition 
45th (1877-79) (D) 5 2 (40%) 100% D 
46th (1879-81) (D) 2 2 (100%) 50% R/50% D 
47th (1881-83) (R) 8 6 (75%) 75% R/25% D 
48th (1883-85) (D) 7 3 (43%) 100% D 
49th (1885-87) (D) 0 0 (0%) N.A. 
50th (1887-89) (D) 0 0 (0%) N.A. 
51st (1889-91) (R) 9 6 (67%) 89% R/11% I 
52nd (1891-93) (D) 1 0 (0%) 100% D 
53rd (1893-95) (D) 3 0 (0%) 100% D 
54th (1895-97) (R) 11 6 (54%) 82% R/18% I 
Source: Martis et al. 1989. 
Reconstruction to the rise of McKinley, except during the Fifty-third 
Congress. While Senate Republicans were clearly much busier during the 
Reconstruction, they stayed vigorously investigative during the post-Re­
construction decades. 
Consider, as well, table 8.4, presenting data on contested elections poli­
tics in the House during the Congresses between the end of Reconstruction 
and the election of McKinley. The rows list the Congresses, their dates, 
and, in parentheses, the designation of which party organized the House of 
Representatives in that Congress. The columns list from left to right (1) the 
total number of contested elections cases that actually affected who was 
seated; (2) the number of such cases from the South and a parenthetical 
listing of the percentage of the total composed by the southern cases, and; 
(3) the disposition of all of the cases. The cells for disposition of the cases 
list the percentage of cases won by either party for that Congress—hence, 
a percentage figure in front of either D, R, or I (Democrat, Republican, or 
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Independent, such as a Greenbacker, Readjuster or Populist). Not all of the 
cases involve Republican-Democratic conflict—for instance, two of the 
three southern cases for the Forty-eighth Congress involved Virginia inde­
pendents allied with the Republicans. 
Table 8.4 indicates several things. First, Republican control of the House 
produced more contested elections politics (26 cases) than Democratic 
control (18 cases), even though Republicans controlled only 3 out of the 10 
Houses organized between 1877 and 1895. Second, such politics, whether 
Democrats or Republicans controlled the House, was primarily southern 
contested elections politics. Indeed, if one considers a fact not in the table, 
that southern seats made up, on average, slightly fewer than 20 percent of 
the seats in the House during this period, then a scan of the parenthetical 
percentage figures in the middle column shows that not only was contested 
elections politics largely southern, it was also disproportionately southern. 
Fourth, the party controlling the House tended to rule in its favor. In this 
connection it is worth noting another fact not in the table: In several cases 
of Republicans ruling against Democrats, they ruled for opponents that 
were not Republicans—two Populists, one from Alabama and one from 
North Carolina, won their cases before the Fifty-fourth Congress. In other 
words, Republicans were not picky about building up congressional oppo­
sition to Democrats so long as they built up opposition.19 
In addition to these tabular data, consider as well evidence concerning 
the enforcement of electoral law. During the Arthur administration (1881-
85), the Department of Justice mounted an aggressive Fifteenth Amend­
ment enforcement effort. The Arthur administration's criminal enforce­
ment effort did not match the level reached during the Reconstruction. Of 
the nearly 5,000 criminal indictments brought in the South between 1870 
and 1894 under statutes implementing the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments, over 1,260, or only about 26 percent, occurred after Recon­
struction, almost all between 1878 and 1884. Still, despite the Reese and 
Cruikshank decisions of 1876, Fifteenth Amendment enforcement was evi­
dently possible during the Arthur administration under surviving sections 
of the 1870 Enforcement Act. 
There are certain interesting patterns in the enforcement data. About 60 
percent of the Reconstruction effort occurred between 1872 and 1875 in 
two states alone, South Carolina and Mississippi. These had black-majority 
populations and were likely to experience high rates of criminal action by 
whites against blacks seeking to vote. In contrast, the post-Reconstruction 
effort focused less on protecting rights and more on building political op­
position. Although indictments were brought in all former Confederate 
states, five states saw a higher number of indictments than during the Re­
construction: Arkansas, Florida, Texas, Louisiana, and Virginia. These 
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TABLE 8.5 
Republican Electoral Performance in Its Historic Base, before and 
after Reconstruction (Percentages) 
1860-72/4 (% won) 1876-92/4 (% won) 
Electoral vote 
Northeast 89 69 
Midwest 98 79 
House seats 
Northeast 73 60 
Midwest 70 52 
Senate seats 
Northeast 92 84 
Midwest 84 61 
Source: Stewart 1991. 
were states with relatively weak Democratic establishments or with anti-
Democratic insurgencies.20 
Clearly the Republicans had a southern policy—but what were the in­
centives for a southern policy? As suggested by table 8.5, the Republican 
Party faced a much more competitive context. In its historic regional bases, 
the Northeast and Midwest, the Republican Party lost ground, even though 
its absolute strength was still quite high. National percentages (not listed in 
the table) show also a much more evenly matched competitive situation 
between the parties. The Republican Party's average percentage of House 
seats dropped from 61 percent during the 1860-74 period to 46 percent 
during the period from 1876 to 1894. Its average percentage of Senate seats 
went from 71 percent to 51 percent. Its average electoral (different from 
popular) vote went from 75 percent to 49 percent. In this more knife-edged 
context, the 11 percent of the former Confederacy's House seats held by 
Republicans during the 1876-94 period and the 10 percent of Senate seats 
might provide a margin for unified government. Or, to put it in another 
way, national Republicans had incentives to regenerate, through further 
investment in Southern politics, a positive rate of return to their Recon­
struction-era sunk costs.21 
For example, during the Garfield-Arthur administration, an alliance 
with the Virginia Readjusters proved crucial in assuring Republican 
unified government for the first time since 1872. The Readjuster move­
ment, which captured the Virginia legislature in 1879, was a militant, 
biracial party committed not only to a free ballot and a fair count but 
also to strengthening public education and making taxes less regressive. 
The Republicans needed an alliance with the Readjusters badly and were 
willing to pay a high price for it. A Virginia Readjuster senator, William 
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Mahone, a Confederate war hero turned railroad magnate and ultimately 
a political reformer who built a biracial coalition, helped the Republi­
cans to organize an evenly divided Senate during the Forty-seventh Con­
gress (1881-83) and thus to give the vice-president a tie-breaking vote. 
In return, Mahone received the chairmanship of the Senate Committee on 
Agriculture during that Congress and membership on three other Senate 
committees.22 
Readjuster success in Virginia hinted at the possibility of challenge, in 
other states, to Democratic control of the governorships, a position crucial 
to a fair certification of victorious, non-Democratic congressional candi­
dates. They often lost close contests when Democratic governors would 
certify Democratic candidates as the winners. Yet the populations of about 
33 percent of the ex-Confederacy's seventy-three congressional districts in 
1881 were majority black. An "anti-Redeemer" (i.e., non-Democratic) 
governor in another key state or two might generate stronger Republican 
and black representation in the House. The rate of return on the southern 
commitment could thus be increased at the margin.23 
There were serious judicial threats to a southern policy: the Civil Rights 
Cases of 1883, in which the Court overturned the Civil Rights Act of 1875, 
and United States v. Harris, curbing Fourteenth Amendment federal action 
to punish private violence by whites against blacks.24 But the Arthur ad­
ministration's legal enforcement effort scored a major and often over­
looked victory in Georgia. There a leader in the Republican-Independent 
alliance was a U.S. attorney. He ran for Congress in 1882 and won criminal 
convictions in 1883 in federal district court against key members of a 
night-riding, Klan-style organization, the Pop and Go Club, that sought to 
punish black supporters of the Republican-Independent alliance. He also 
won on appeal to the Supreme Court in ex parte Yarbrough (1884). 
Yarbrough was critically important because it opened up rich new possibil­
ities for national electoral regulation in the South. In Yarbrough the Court 
unanimously announced a constitutionally valid connection between the 
Fifteenth Amendment and Congress's Article 1 power to regulate its own 
elections. It held that the Fifteenth Amendment created a national and 
congressionally enforceable right to vote for blacks; suffrage came from 
the United States as well as from any given state in which a black citizen 
resided. Second, it held that Congress "must have the power to protect 
the elections on which its existence depends from violence and corrup­
tion." In effect, what Congress could not do through the Enforcement Act 
of 1870 or the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, it could do through Article 1 for 
congressional elections. The decision thus fused the Fifteenth Amendment 
to the electoral regulatory system put into place under the Federal Elections 
Act of 1871.25 
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The potential impact of Yarbrough was enormous. But not until the ad­
ministration of Benjamin Harrison, when Republicans briefly again en­
joyed unified government, could the effort to act on these implications 
begin. That effort took the shape of the Federal Elections Bill of 1890-91, 
which built on the Federal Elections Act. Often treated as a half-hearted 
echo of Reconstruction, the bill is more accurately read as an effort to seize 
the opportunities provided by Yarbrough. The bill did fail in the Senate— 
in a moment of high drama in which a small Republican faction torpedoed 
what the rest of the Republican Party clearly desired. 
To sum up: The Republicans had a post-Reconstruction southern policy. 
Some of it ran aground on the reefs of judicial action. Also, a key initiative 
was killed in the Senate by a minority faction within the party. But this 
post-Reconstruction policy was vigorous—strong enough to call forth an 
even more vigorous Democratic backlash. Let me turn to the Democratic 
response to a southern policy. 
Democratic Backlash 
During the Harrison administration, southern Democrats in Florida and 
Tennessee enacted legislation to restrict the suffrage. In Mississippi they 
rewrote the state constitution for that purpose. These states thus joined 
South Carolina and Georgia, which already had suffrage-restrictive legisla­
tion on the books. But the Democratic presidential platform for 1892 went 
further. It made the Elections Bill and, by implication, the very idea of a 
federal electoral-regulatory system its first objects of attack. Both in its 
printed material for public circulation (booklets and posters) and in the 
themes chosen by Democratic speakers touring the country, the Demo­
cratic campaign made electoral regulation the party's most important—its 
first and paramount—issue. This is a little-known fact about the 1892 cam­
paign, but another look at table 8.1 helps to confirm it.26 
When Cleveland won his second presidency, the Democratic party 
found itself—for the first time since the Buchanan administration of 1857-
61—enjoying unified control of the national government. It used this 
control to act on its 1892 platform and campaign. In 1893 and 1894 con­
gressional Democrats repealed twenty-eight of the sections in the United 
States Statutes under the title of "Elective Franchise," and ten of the sec­
tions, and a part of an eleventh, under the title of "Crimes."27 
Meanwhile, regional change in electoral law continued. In 1895 South 
Carolina's disenfranchising constitutional convention instituted a poll tax 
(which in poor, rural, credit-starved areas had a devastating impact) as well 
as literacy and good understanding tests. Alabama and Virginia put per-
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sonal registration and the Australian ballot on the books. Personal registra­
tion increased the costs of voting, requiring a potential voter to take time 
away from the field or factory, and placed enormous discretion in the 
hands of local registrars. As for the Australian ballot, it undercut local Re­
publican or third-party formations, since they no longer were the interme­
diaries between the voter and the ballot box that provided ballots. It was 
subtly disenfranchising in another way because such a ballot placed a pre­
mium on literacy.28 
Republican and Populist Resistance to 
Democratic Backlash 
Republicans sought to resist these trends. Although space precludes an ac­
count of the Republican-Populist alliance in the South, it is worth noting 
that northern Republicans arranged fusions with southern Populists in 
1894. Senator George Hoar (R-Mass.), the Senate manager of the Federal 
Elections Bill in 1890-91, raised money for Reuben Kolb, an Alabama 
Populist. Senator William Chandler (R-N.H.)—the architect of the Arthur 
administration's southern strategy—called for and got a Senate investiga­
tion of the Alabama elections in a Senate newly returned to Republican 
control. In North Carolina, white fusionists gained control of the legisla­
ture, undoing suffrage-restrictive legislation in the 1895 session and en­
couraging black organization. George White, the last black southern 
congressman until 1973, was elected as a Republican from North Carolina 
to the first of two terms in 1896. Two fusionist senators, Marion Butler 
and Jeter Pritchard, went to the U.S. Senate in 1895 and 1897, respec­
tively. 
Two other indications of Republican resistance are contested elections 
politics and the 1896 platform. The Republican-controlled House during 
the Fifty-fourth Congress was active in unseating southern Democrats, get­
ting rid of as many as it had during the Fifty-first Congress, when it took up 
the Federal Elections Bill. Second, the 1896 Republican platform con­
demned lynching and disenfranchisement.29 
In short, as late as 1896 the Republican party's southern policy was, 
despite setbacks, alive and well. Let me turn now to the McKinley adminis­
tration, during which the historic southern policy of the Republican Party 
collapsed. In the standard narrative of a steady Republican retreat from the 
South from 1872 on, the post-1896 developments within the Republican 
Party are the last act in the betrayal of southern African Americans. But it 
is more of a puzzle than that—and it is explicable from within this chap­
ter's party-centered approach. 
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The Logic of Disinvestment 
Within a few years of McKinley's election it was clear that the RepubUcan 
Party had abandoned a historic southern policy. There was silence about 
race riots and lynchings. Republicans literally did nothing in the Fifty-fifth 
Congress about disenfranchisement. In the Fifty-sixth Congress Republi­
cans failed to assist fusionist politicians in North Carolina.30 In time it be­
came clear that the first McKinley administration was a watershed. From 
1901 to 1929 Congressional Republicans and African American leaders 
periodically sought to place disenfranchisement on the national legislative 
agenda. Also, Republican presidential platforms raised the issue in 1900, 
1904, and 1908 (although not thereafter). The priority index of equal suf­
frage, introduced in table 8.1, above, yields scores for these years of 0.58, 
0.32, and 0.59. But the political counterpoint to these legislative efforts and 
platform stances comprised death in committee, overwhelming procedural 
votes against further pursuit of the issue, and led to efforts by prominent 
Republicans to change delegate representation at Republican national con­
ventions so as to destroy the remaining influence of the South's Black-and-
Tan Republican politicians within presidential nominating politics. Repub­
lican leaders actually voiced dismay (in Theodore Roosevelt's words) over 
"the folly . .. of reconstruction based on universal Negro suffrage."31 
What explains this shift? During the Harrison administration, a brief 
two-year period of Republican unified government was the occasion for a 
major electoral regulatory effort, the Force Bill, that probably would have 
succeeded had one vote on a procedural motion in the Senate gone differ­
ently. Also, during the second Cleveland administration, Republicans re­
sisted the Democratic counterattack, allying themselves with Alabama and 
North Carolina Populists. As late as the 1896 presidential nominating con­
vention black Republican delegates from the South played a key role in 
convention politics. 
Republicans might well have found it easy, furthermore, to return to 
their historic role. In 1904, for instance, the Republican presidential plat­
form noted that the party "entered upon its present period of complete 
supremacy in 1897." But despite "complete supremacy" nothing really 
happened—why?32 
A key part of the answer surely has to do with new tariff, monetary, and 
foreign policy issues. But much of the answer also has to do with the 
change that occurred between 1893 and 1897 in the costs and benefits of a 
historic policy. Given scarce organizational resources and a historic con­
text that provides incentives for selective mobilization, American party 
leaderships have always faced choices about whether they will contest all 
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jurisdictions in the system. They are strategic about rates of return on com­
mitments to contest. By the late 1890s it was clear that the rate of return on 
the southern commitment had dropped. Also, the national electoral cycle's 
outcomes had begun to provide clear information of increased electoral 
success in other regions. That is, the rate of return on other commitments 
had simultaneously increased. The net result was rapid disinvestment from 
the South. 
Democratic Resistance 
Bear in mind that the Democratic Party simultaneously combined national 
and regional change in the rules of the electoral game and that there were 
threats of widespread resistance to a vigorous national policy, such as mob 
and paramilitary violence in 1889 and 1890 in northern Florida, which had 
led to the assassination of a deputy U.S. marshal and the resignation of the 
U.S. marshal for northern Florida.33 
More fundamentally, perhaps, the new state-level rules restricted the 
electorate to a pool of white conservative Democrats that Republicans 
could never mobilize. The disenfranchising conventions and the southern 
legislatures had devised rules that shrank the legal registrant pool. Under 
Yarbrough only national regulation of national elections was protected; 
states could pretty much do what they wanted. But what point was there to 
national regulation of national elections if the registrant pool was minus­
cule, white, and strongly Democratic? Only a massive new commitment— 
a true "second Reconstruction"—could cope with this problem. 
The South's New Superfluousness 
The potentially exorbitant costs of a renewed southern policy also have to 
be laid against the South's superfluousness to the incipient Republican res­
toration, a restoration that looked by 1904 to be a "period of complete 
supremacy." Here the key facts are the basic differences between the 1877-
97 phase in U.S. party politics and the phase after 1897 in (1) the Republi­
can Party's capacity to achieve unified government and (2) the marginal 
contribution of southern Republicanism to that capacity. 
During the former phase, the Republican party struggled to achieve uni­
fied government, and succeeded both times only for brief two-year peri­
ods—1881-83 and 1889-91—that ended abruptly after midterm, off-year 
elections. Yet in both two-year periods Republican involvement in the 
South played important roles. In the 1881-83 episode, alliance with the 
Readjusters permitted the Republicans to organize the Senate during the 
This content downloaded from 
             130.58.34.221 on Wed, 14 Jul 2021 14:31:04 UTC              
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
PARTIES AND DISENFRANCHISEMENT 207 
TABLE 8.6 
Shifts in Regional Bases of National Politics, 1876-1892/4 and 1896-1908/10 (Percentages) 
Presidential Electoral 
Vote House Senate 
1876- 1896- 1876- 1896- 1876- 1896-
1892/4 1908/10 1892/4 1908/10 1892/4 1908/10 
Confederacy 26 25 19 13 28 24 
Northeast 29 26 31 29 23 20 
Midwest 21 19 26 27 13 12 
Border 11 10 11 12 13 12 
West 13 19 13 19 25 33 
Source: Stewart 1991. 
Forty-seventh Congress by giving the vice-president tie-breaking power. 
Without the Republican-Readjuster alliance, there would have been no uni­
fied government.34 In the 1889-91 episode, a contingent of fifteen Southern 
Republicans contributed to the 179-152 advantage that the Republicans 
had in the Fifty-first Congress, at a time when the policy agenda of the 
party was long and when the pent-up demand for new legislative initiatives 
was unusually strong. Without them, the margin to legislate decreased con­
siderably.35 
After 1897, in sharp contrast, the Republican Party was continually able 
to create unified government—and without any southern presence. For the 
elections between and including 1896 and 1908, the mean of the Republi­
can percentage of the presidential electoral vote (distinct from the presiden­
tial popular vote) was 65.7 percent. The mean of its percentage of the 
House seats between the Fifteenth Congress (1897-99) and the Sixtieth 
Congress (1907-9) was 56.9 percent, and for the Senate the comparable 
figure was 60.7 percent. 
The party's strength in its historic base, the Northeast and Midwest, re­
turned after McKinley's election in 1896, in the wake of the intense Repub­
lican mobilization during that campaign. Further, the party's strength 
increased in two other areas, the border states and the western states. 
Consider also table 8.6. The rows are for regions and the columns are for 
pairs of percentages by national institution. The first number in the pair is 
the percentage corresponding to the period 1876-92/4; the second number 
in the pair is the percentage corresponding to the period 1896-1908/10. 
The percentages are for the proportion of individuals from that region 
elected to the House or the Senate for the period, or the percentage of elec­
toral votes for the region for the period. For instance, the cell for the Con­
federacy and the House shows two things: (1) between 1876 and 1894, 19 
percent of all of the individuals elected to the House were from the ex-
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Confederate states and (2) between 1896 and 1910 13 percent of all the 
individuals elected to the House were from the ex-Confederate states. The 
same principles apply to all of the other cells in the table.36 
Political and organizational incentives for the pursuit of a southern pol­
icy, of the kind that existed between the Compromise of 1877 and the elec­
tion of McKinley, disappeared after 1896. The Republican Party's strength 
returned in its historic base—in part the result of mobilization around tariff 
and monetary policy issues in the high-stakes 1896 election. Also, Repub­
lican strength grew in the border states, and it was high in the western 
states. These changes coincided with important shifts in the regional bases 
of national politics that added to the South's new irrelevance to the Repub­
lican Party. 
The former Confederacy grew less important, relative to other regions. 
Other regions also grew less important, but their decline in importance was 
not as great as the Confederacy's. Thus Republicans grew stronger in re­
gions that were only slightly less important than they once had been. At the 
same time Republican strength remained considerable in the region that 
became the winner in the regional shift—the western states. 
That the western states proved to be an important component of the new 
Republican period of "complete supremacy" was a planned outcome. The 
same degree of political insecurity after the Compromise of 1877 that moti­
vated a Republican southern policy also motivated a Republican western 
policy. At the outset of the Harrison administration, six new states, the 
largest number ever to be admitted in any presidency and five of them 
safely Republican, were admitted to the Union. This relative flood of new 
states resulted from careful Republican maneuver in Congress to sustain 
partisan advantage. Ironically, the party's western policy, based on the 
kinds of motivations that also had gone into a southern policy, ultimately 
contributed to the Republican Party's disinvestment from the South: the 
western policy helped to make the South superfluous to Republican Party 
interests.37 
Here we see the influence of geography on party competition. In most 
modern political systems the boundaries of the system are fixed. New ju­
risdictions cannot be added. But the nineteenth-century U.S. party system 
had a "reserve" of unorganized territory, acquired through military con­
quest of Native Americans and colonized by small numbers of voters and 
practicing politicians with links to the party system in the older jurisdic­
tions. This reserve provided one of the conditions for the resolution of the 
Democratic-Republican struggle that first erupted in 1867 over the bound­
aries of the suffrage in America. It meant that if the Republicans developed 
a western policy they could, in effect, be "compensated" for the demobili­
zation of a historic constituency and for the destruction of electoral regula­
tory institutions they had built up and tenaciously defended for decades. 
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The rate of return on an investment in the West could replace at a higher 
level the current rate of return on investment in the South. 
Let me sum up before turning to the regional impact of the Republican 
Party's disinvestment from the South. By the middle of the first McKinley 
administration, when McKinley toured the South praising the Confederate 
war dead, it had become clear that the consummation of the Compromise 
of 1877 was finally at hand. New issues, such as foreign policy, figured in 
the GOP disinvestment. But their influence on the GOP also interacted 
strongly with an abrupt change in the costs and benefits of the party's his­
toric southern policy. The costs of a southern policy were now very high 
indeed, and the benefits were nil. Both a resurgence of strength in historic 
Republican areas and new strength in the West made the South superfluous 
to Republican capacity to achieve unified government. 
By the end of the Cleveland administration, the Democratic Party had 
gone very far toward altering the rules of electoral politics, making a return 
to the status quo ante prohibitively costly for the Republican Party. And by 
the end of the 1896 presidential campaign, it had become clear for Republi­
cans that there were likely to be rich alternatives to a southern policy. It 
would take a few more electoral cycles for this structural change in national 
party dynamics to become completely clear—thus, debate about the 
emerging "southern system" continued within the party, leaving its mark 
on presidential platforms until 1908. But the change in national party dy­
namics appears to have been clear enough during the MciCinley adminis­
tration to motivate the kind of sharp change in the Republican Party's sym­
bolic stance toward the South represented by McKinley's southern tour. 
Let me turn now to consideration of the South's regional political oppor­
tunity structure. Political signals from the national political environment 
were a key feature of the political opportunity structure of the South. Such 
signals, and change in them, had a large impact on the political capacities 
of the South's political actors. 
The Impact of Disinvestment 
What impact did the Republican Party's final disinvestment have on the 
South? Since the Reconstruction, the region's inclusionists—to recall a 
term introduced earlier—had been an active force in the South's politics. 
These included (1) African American politicians and activists and (2) their 
white allies, both local Republicans and leaders of white-led economic in­
surgencies, for example, the Readjuster movement, the Arkansas Agricul­
tural Wheel, and the North Carolina Populists, all of which explicitly called 
for a "free ballot and fair count" and broad-based educational and tax poli­
cies favored by African Americans. Their opponents, whom I have called 
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exclusionists, sometimes adopted paternalistic stances toward African 
Americans and sometimes were openly white supremacist. Republican dis­
investment—the inaction toward the South that became clear by 1898— 
strongly affected these actors' political capacities. 
Republican inaction was not, of course, the only influence on the politi­
cal capacities of the South's protagonists. But it is an influence whose role 
has not yet been fully appreciated. Because the Compromise of 1877 is 
seen as so pivotal, there is a tendency to cast subsequent processes leading 
to disenfranchisement in largely regional terms. In doing so, the critical 
interaction between national and regional dynamics can easily be over­
looked. 
The process of final disinvestment that began sometime about 1897-
98 necessarily decreased the political capacities of inclusionists. It ac­
complished this both by shutting off resources and by ensuring that there 
would be no favorable political opportunities, thus extinguishing political 
hope. Correlatively, therefore, disinvestment also augmented the political 
capacities of exclusionists. Southern Democratic parties had of course al­
ready grown stronger—but now there was less expectation of a national 
challenge. 
The sharpness of the shift in the region's structure of political opportuni­
ties can be appreciated by reviewing the impact that Republican persis­
tence in a southern policy had in the decade and a half or so between the 
Arthur administration's southern strategy and McKinley's 1898 tour of the 
South. Consider, first, the impact of continuing to contest congressional 
elections. 
The continued presence of Republicans, or candidates willing to be pub­
lic about fusion with Republicans, meant that money would be sent south, 
after consultation between local and national Republicans. It also meant 
that state-level Republican parties had to be staffed in order for ballots to 
be provided to voters. Until the 1890s and the advent of the Australian 
ballot in American politics, parties printed and provided ballots to voters, 
if sometimes under state regulation. For them to provide ballots on election 
day there had to be at least a skeletal party infrastructure. With such an 
infrastructure came county- and statewide conventions. These often were 
sites of struggle between white officeholders and black politicians vying 
for shares of federal patronage—but they could also be forums for partici­
pation, debate, platform drafting, and reaffirmation of principle. They 
played key roles in the development of a regional cadre of black politicians. 
Here the federal patronage and the system of U.S. attorneys and U.S. 
marshals, who were often empowered to hire temporary assistants, proved 
crucial in providing a political infrastructure. In many states, both a party 
staff and at least a smattering of "mobilizers" and "contacters" worked the 
electorate. Supporting these party workers were networks of regional and 
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local institutions, such as African American churches (among other associ­
ations), that were used for communication of political directives.38 
Second, consider the impact of federal criminal prosecutions. There 
were about 1,260 federal criminal cases bunched into the 1877-84 and the 
1889-93 periods of Republican control of the presidency, with most in the 
former period. Some of these—how many is very hard to say, of course— 
created some hope of justice, and some created financial burdens for the 
defendants or otherwise gave pause to them.39 
Consider, third, the impact of congressional investigations. The public­
ity of such investigations created hope of further federal intervention. An 
investigation was sometimes seen as a party-building technique by politi­
cians in the region. In order for these investigations to proceed, networks of 
local activists had to be contacted and witnesses had to be brought to Wash­
ington or to where the investigation was sitting.40 
Finally, consider the impact of commitment to national legislative re­
form. The national party repeatedly called for "free ballots and fair counts" 
in the South. State-level southern parties echoed this commitment in their 
own platforms. Thus, when the party achieved unified government in 1889, 
something like the Federal Elections Bill was widely expected and there 
were regional reactions. In Mississippi, for instance, the bill's introduction 
led African American leaders to hold a state convention in Jackson, a move 
characterized by a standard history as a "shock" to the white establishment. 
The convention communicated a request to Democratic leaders for fusion 
candidacies, per the policy of black leaders of working with Democrats 
"until it was possible to vote once more as Republicans." When Democrats 
refused, perhaps not unexpectedly, the convention entered the first state­
wide Republican ticket since 1875. Eventually, violent attacks on cam­
paign rallies forced the withdrawal of the entire ticket. The episode none­
theless says much about the quickness with which African American 
leaders could and did organize in response to major political opportunities 
in their national and regional environment.41 
In sum, there was a continuous provision of encouragement and re­
sources involved in Republican persistence in a southern policy. This na­
tional-regional interaction played at least a modest role in sustaining the 
often high levels of African American voting discovered by Kousser and, 
as well, by Rusk and Stucker, both for the Deep and peripheral South 
states. Rosenstone and Hansen have shown that electoral participation de­
pends much more than had previously been thought on political mobiliza­
tion, and less on attitudes and individual-level political resources. Thus the 
level of hope and the local, albeit fragile, Republican institutions that were 
encouraged by national inputs partly explain the persistence of African 
American local, state legislative, and congressional political careers well 
into the 1890s.42 
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National-regional interaction also helped to stimulate biracial coalitions 
under the banner of third-party economic insurgencies. Fusion candidacies 
in states where the Republican Party was reasonably strong lowered the 
threshold of political entry for such insurgencies. While black politicians 
often had mixed feelings about these insurgencies, a look at the preponder­
ance of evidence in a recent treatment of Chester Arthur's southern strategy 
suggests that black support for fusion was strong, if primarily tactical in 
nature. Furthermore, in two cases, the Readjusters (1879-89) and the North 
Carolina Populist-Republicans (1896-99), such insurgencies permitted the 
rapid mobilization of very strong, county-level and municipal black poli­
tics. Only savage race riots instigated by conservative Democrats sufficed 
to crush these mobilizations.43 
Thus the almost complete cessation after 1897 of national inputs into 
southern politics was, in itself, an important intervention into regional pol­
itics. A seemingly remarkable feature of disenfranchisement in its later 
stages was the lack of overt black protest in the region. While many factors 
produced apparent quiescence, one of these was surely the rational judg­
ment that protest would not spark national assistance and that it would 
provoke exceptional violence. 
By the same token, the Republican failure to return to a southern policy 
affected exclusionist capacities. It combined with the cumulative effects of 
violence, intimidation, and pre-1897 state-level rules changes to create a 
context within which disenfranchisers considered themselves freer to com­
plete the process of disenfranchisement. There may be more than just a 
correlation in the fact that much of the activity of disenfranchisement oc­
curred after the rise of McKinley Republicanism. North Carolina instituted 
sweeping change in 1899 and 1900. Alabama's disenfranchising conven­
tion of 1901 established a poll tax, literacy and property tests, and a grand­
father clause for registration prior to 1902. Virginia's disenfranchising 
convention of 1902 established a poll tax, a literacy test, a property test, 
and an understanding test. Texas established a poll tax in 1902. Georgia 
established a literacy test, a property test, and an understanding test in 
1908. Final Republican disinvestment from the South may well have shut 
off, as it were, a yellow light in the region that signaled "proceed with 
caution" and may have turned on a green light.44 
GOP disinvestment from the South toward the close of the century 
helped to make disenfranchisement an unstoppable process. It deprived 
inclusionists of resources and hope. It encouraged exclusionists to recast 
entirely the basic electoral foundations of political democracy in the 
South—and, in the process, to shift the 90 percent of America's black citi­
zens living in the South well to the margins of the political nation's bound­
aries. The introduction of the Australian ballot (placing a premium on voter 
literacy), seemingly nominal poll taxes (which captured a surprisingly 
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large percentage of the total annual disposable income of debt-burdened 
sharecroppers, tenants, and freehold farmers), literacy tests, good under­
standing clauses, grandfather clauses, and white primaries all combined to 
erect impassable barriers between African Americans (and many whites) 
and the electoral system. When complete by about 1908, the "southern 
system" was much more efficient in establishing racial exclusion than ear­
lier, relatively scattershot mechanisms of intimidation, fraud, violence, and 
vote dilution. And its efficiency set the stage for a new phase in America's 
long and epic struggle over black voting rights. Considering that phase is 
beyond my scope, however—so I will turn now to brief summary of my 
party-centered analysis of disenfranchisement. 
Party Dynamics, Disenfranchisement, and 
American Democracy 
After the Reconstruction, party competition strongly influenced the politi­
cal prospects of African Americans. Given the demographic concentration 
of African Americans in the South, their role in electoral politics depended 
on the persistence of at least one of the major parties in forcing system-
wide conflict and mobilization. Such persistence was there. National party 
dynamics from 1877 to the mid-1890s helped to sustain some of the inclu-
siveness achieved by the Reconstruction. Such dynamics preserved some 
of the "refounding" of the American system represented by the Recon­
struction. 
But party dynamics were also tightly connected to regional calculations. 
When the incentives to the more inclusionist Republican Party to engage in 
systemwide mobilization and competition finally and irreversibly changed, 
the "new Constitution" instituted after the Civil War then truly lost much 
of its life. Republican disinvestment from the South did much to permit the 
establishment of the "southern system." 
Disenfranchisement had a regional location. But it left many imprints on 
the system as a whole, influencing the future of American life. All southern 
black—and many southern white—voters lost direct electoral influence 
over state legislatures, county commissions, and city and town councils. 
Segregationists completed the construction of an elaborate system of color 
lines and codified it in law. Without any political representation for the 
great majority of black Americans, African Americans were also vulner­
able to a gradual strengthening of de facto color lines in the nation as a 
whole. To paraphrase C. Vann Woodward, the Southern Way became the 
American Way in race relations.45 Disenfranchisement thus contributed to 
the deepening and magnification of racial stratification in America. It has, 
in fact, taken decades of African American struggle in building national 
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groups, planning litigation, and mounting broad movements of protest to 
help in creating the closely related processes—still underway, with many 
steps backward and forward—of both restoring life to the "new Constitu­
tion" instituted after the Civil War and of dismantling racial hierarchy in 
America. 
Notes 
1. Katznelson, Geiger, and Kryder 1993; Myrdal 1944. 
2. Cf. Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens 1992, 122-32; and McAdam 
1982, 66-67, focusing on social and economic factors. 
3. Wang 1993; Ayers 1992; Kousser 1992; Rusk and Stucker 1978; and Kousser 
1974 exemplify the new understanding. Examples of misconceptions about the 
Compromise of 1877 are Swain 1993, 21; and Carmines and Stimson 1989, 29. 
4. Terms inclusionist and exclusionist from Valelly 1993. 
5. This understanding of the relationship between mobilization and institutional 
context derived from Powell 1986, esp. p. 21. 
6. On "sunk costs," see Stinchcombe 1968,120-25. "Commitment to contest" is 
my term. 
7. DeSantis 1982, discusses the scholarly controversy over the longevity of the 
Compromise. Carmines and Stimson 1989, 29. 
8. See Kousser 1974 for basic theory of parties having preferences over electoral 
institutions. See Stewart and Weingast 1992,225, 270, and 225 n. 11, for a succinct, 
clear statement. On party unity and its electoral systemic origins, see Kousser, 1992. 
On internal politics, see Wang 1993, chap. 6. 
9. Kousser 1992 is quite important for understanding this consensus. 
10. For an important work that makes this clear, see Martis and Elmes 1993. 
11. Abasic discussion of "political opportunity structure" is in McAdam 1982. 
For an overlooked discussion of an important case, enslaved African Americans and 
their responses to shifts in their political opportunity structure, see Du Bois [1935] 
1992, chaps. 1-7. See also Foner 1988, chap. 3. 
12. Cf. Valelly 1993 and cites therein. 
13. Ibid., 39^0. 
14. On the fee system, see Goldman 1976, 279, 283, 302; for the enforcement 
effort, entire vol.; enforcement statistics for 1870-77 are at 70 n. 31. 
15. 16. On the 1871 Federal Elections Act, see Burke 1968; and Wang 1993, 
chap. 2 and app. 3, reproducing the statute. 
16. See Benedict 1978; Nieman 1991, 92-99; Kousser 1992, 160-64; Magrath 
1963, chap. 7. 
17. Adaptation of the Racial Priority Index of Party Platforms, Carmines 
and Stimson 1989, 56-57. For coding equal suffrage priority, I counted all para­
graphs that explicitly referred to a "free ballot," a "free ballot and a fair count," 
the Fifteenth Amendment, the merits of federal vs. state control of elections, and 
equal adult male suffrage. First paragraph of platform coded as a preamble and 
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not a paragraph if it ended with a colon, notwithstanding any substantive statement 
in the preamble. 
18. Why would Democrats sponsor investigations? For equally partisan pur­
poses is the answer. Thus, in connection with the 1876 contested presidential elec­
tion, the House of Representatives, organized by the Democratic party, sponsored a 
total of four investigations. 
19. For more on the politics of contested elections, see Allen and Allen 1981, 
176-78. 
20. See Burke 1968, 146-54; and Goldman 1976, 311-12. 
21. Data from Stewart 1991, 208, 210, 212, 217, tables 9.3-9.6. 
22. Readjusters sought "readjustment" of the state debt downward via partial 
transfer to West Virginia and the upping of revenues through corporate taxation. 
Both moves would redress looting of the school fund for debt retirement and reduce 
the tax system's regressivity. Cf. Ayers 1992, 46-47; Doenecke 1981, 50-53; Deg-
Ier 1982, 270-315. See also Martis et al. 1989, 45. See U.S. Congress 1989, 1414, 
for Mahone's committee appointments. 
23. Percentage of districts majority black estimated from Parsons, Beach, and 
Dubin 1986, 146-223. 
24. For concise discussion of these cases, see Wang 1993, 398-405; Kousser 
1992, 160-62; McCurdy 1986; and Wiecek 1988, 96-101. 
25. See Burke 1968, 153-66 for doctrinal background to Yarbrough and for im­
pact. McCurdy 1986 succinctly describes the cases. Regarding Yarbrough itself, see 
Goldman 1976, 192-204. Cf. also Wang 1993, 391-408. 
26. Knoles 1942, 8-12, 91-92, 136, 138-39, 144-45, 161-62, 168-170, 171-
72, 173-74, 177-78, 193-94, 208-9, 213-16 (esp. summary remarks at 216 and 
discussion in n. 66), 220-21, 224-25. 
27. Schwartz 1970, 806. 
28. Kousser 1974, 239. 
29. DeSantis 1959, chap. 6; Sherman 1973, 2, 8-9, 16. While the Priority Index 
of Equal Suffrage is not especially high (0.30), it is still higher than it is for 1880 or 
1884, the two years bracketing the Arthur administration's southern strategy. 
30. Sherman 1973 chap. 1. 
31. Ibid., 72, 77, 95-97, 169, 170-71, 221-23. See also Allen, Clausen, and 
Clubb 1971. 
32. Johnson and Porter 1966, 137. 
33. Goldman 1976, 250-68. 
34. Further, the Republican capacity to hang onto the Senate in the Forty-eighth 
Congress, thus preventing Democratic dominance of the Congress as a whole in the 
second half of the Arthur administration, depended critically on the 1882 election of 
a second Readjuster senator from Virginia, creating a Republican-Readjuster coali­
tion of forty, against thirty-six Democrats. On the relative importance of this, see 
Stewart and Weingast 1992, 259-69. 
35. On pent-up policy demand, see Socolofsky and Spetter 1987, 47. 
36. Stewart 1991,208, 210,212, 217. Cf. also Stanley and Niemi 1992, 139; and 
Martis and Elmes 1993, 70-84. 
37. See Stewart and Weingast 1992, 236^42, 258. 
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38. The evidence is fragmentary, and sometimes offered from within the "Re­
publican betrayal" framework, but suggestive enough. See Anderson 1981, esp. 
159-61, 340-42; Bacote 1955, 65-67; Uzee 1950. 
39. Again, the evidence in secondary sources is not extensive, but see Cooper 
1968, 32, 70-71, 84-85, 94-106; Anderson, 1981, 91, 112, 340-42. 
40. Congressional Information Service 1985, 515-16, 525, 528-29, listing wit­
nesses for major post-Reconstruction investigations. In 1894 in South Carolina's 
Second District, which was not the historic "black" Seventh District, Republicans 
organized poll watching in order to trigger a House contested election investigation 
that deprived Democrats of the seat. See Tindall 1949, 212-34, at 231. Also, see 
Uzee 1950, 48-49. 
41. Wharton 1965, 203-9. 
42. Kousser 1974; Rusk and Stucker 1978; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993, chaps. 
5-7. 
43. Degler 1982, 292-300 (on the Danbury, Va., riot and its role in the collapse 
of the Readjuster movement) and 359-66 (on the role of the Wilmington, N.C., riot 
in the collapse of the Populist-Republican fusion movement of North Carolina). 
44. Kousser 1974, chaps. 6-7, and p. 239. 
45. Woodward 1974, 67-118 and 115. 
This content downloaded from 
             130.58.34.221 on Wed, 14 Jul 2021 14:31:04 UTC              
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
